Misconstruals of Classical Theism’s Analogia are often located on the anthropological side

​Many misinterpretations of classical theism, and its analogia, are not so much grounded in misunderstandings regarding the revealed divine nature, which as primarily love seems straightforward enough, but in impoverished conceptions of nature, in general, human nature, in particular.

If we don’t begin with a good anthropology of humanity and good phenomenology of nature …our analogical predications between our existential orientations (such as via an aesthetical primacy) and the transcendental imperatives — both suggested in nature, metaphysically, and specially revealed in the divine attributes, theologically (such as via an aesthetic teleology) — will be impoverished.

A theonoetic of divine omniscience gets misinterpreted due to misunderstandings of the nature of the future (open?), metaphysically, the nature of the human will (in/determined?), anthropologically, and the nature of freedom (libertarian & absolute?), itself, phenomenologically.

A theopathic account of divine omnipathy gets misinterpreted due to misunderstandings of the nature of passibility, substantially and accidentally rather than relationally, such as vis a vis the esse naturale or esse intentionale, whether divine or human, such as between natural formal distinctions and divine trans-formal distinctions.

And so on and so forth, re the theoethics, theo-perichoretics and theopoietics of omnibenevolence, omnipresence and omnipotence.

Below is just An Inventory of Questions.

It’s not an essay, just a punch-list of categories to help identify distinctions that can make a difference anthropologically, phenomenologically and theologically.

are metaphysics moonshine?

trying to thread the needle between an epistemic humility or hubris, epistemic virtue or vice, between apophatic and kataphatic, affective and speculative, or encratism, quietism, fideism, pietism, rationalism, evidentialism, as well as univocal, equivocal and analogical predications

but, before these are epistemological issues, theologically, we encounter them metaphysically, not just vis a vis divine causal joints but vis a vis emergent layers of complexity and their respective teloi or creation’s causal joints, hence, e.g. trans-formal distinction

so, metaphysical agnosticism and theological skepticism go hand in hand
re epistemic warrant, normative justifications, evidentiary standards and burdens of proof, all which must attend to the given subject matter at hand in an apposite way

are evidential, plausibilist arguments im/possible and/or un/necessary vis a vis various interpretations, whether quantum or theo-logical?

if im/possible and/or un/necessary in metaphysics, how so, then, theologically?

the weaker our arguments (via suitable epistemic humility and warrant) the less necessary any evidential, plausibilist argumentation, e.g. peirce’s humble argument or reformed epistemology’s proper basicality and the stronger our metaphysical agnosticism and/or theological skepticism, the less possible any evidential, plausibilist argumentation

the stronger our argumentation (via an unsuitable epistemic hubris and imagined epistemic warrant) and the stronger our metaphysical rationalism, the more necessary our evidential argumentation?

any perceived need for a plausibilist evidential argumentation is proportional to and commensurate with the perceived degree of epistemic warrant (scholastic notations?) for any given argument (abductively and deductively, possibly inductively)

epistemic parity metaphysically extends theologically and both thus require equiprobabilist principles and evidentiary standards applied to normative justifications

cumulative case of abductive-deductive musings like Peirce’s neglected argument contrasted with the virtually impossible evidential theodicies, which are, in many ways, like irreducible complexity arguments

the reasonableness of faith’s leap, an existential disjunction, avoids fideism via epistemic parity (equiprobability principle and normative justification), avoids rationalism via epistemic humility (e.g. metaphysical agnosticism and theological skepticism), avoids quietism via analogical predication and epistemic warrant, avoids encratism via analogical predication and liturgical cultivation

philosophical theology

reality of God, established via equiprobable epistemic warrant and defensible normative justifications

existential disjunctions at equiplausibility junctions w/axiologically forced, existentially vital and equiprobably live options

logical, abductive-deductive argument akin to argument, not argumentation, for reality, not being, of god

evidential theodicy, plausibilistic argumentation as im/possible and/or un/necessary?

type of creatio, whether ex nihilo, profundis, tohu bohu?

mereological relationships vis a vis fallacy of composition, mereological reality as mute, brute or fruit?

Divine Attributes

attributes of God, variously established


via kerygma, mystagogy, polydoxic sophiology and not metaphysics, God is love

analogy of anthropo-noetic vs theo-noetic?

misunderstandings, phenomenologically re nature of future and anthropologically re nature of human will?

open vs foreknown, but bad phenomenology re nature of future, 3ns, even 4ns?

compatabilist or incompatabilist? but bad anthropology re libertarian free will which involves epistemic distancing of personal agency via formative dynamics, freedom as authenticity?


via kerygma, mystagogy, polydoxic sophiology and not metaphysics, God is love

analogy of anthropo-pathic vs theo-pathic?

misunderstandings of the nature of passibility, substantially and accidentally rather than relationally?


via kerygma, mystagogy, polydoxic sophiology and not metaphysics, God is love

misunderstandings re nature of evil, hence of goodness, privatio boni

e.g.  moral vs ontic privation, suffering vs pain, intrinsic vs ontic, proportionalist vs consequentialist vs deontological?unavoidable double effect, essential instrumental vs unavoidable 

instrumental vis a vis human moral calculus, anthropologically?

and God’s relationship to evil, moral and natural?

analogy of anthropo-ethical vs theo-ethical realities?


via kerygma, mystagogy, polydoxic sophiology and not metaphysics, God is love

and per

panen- via classical or process, which must be phenomenologically triadic/pentadic and theologically penta/trini/tarian?

misunderstandings re communal and social-relational realities?

analogy of anthropo-perichoretical vs theo-perichoretical realities?

misunderstandings regarding essential, modal, conceptual and formal distinctions as well as univocal, equivocal and analogical predications


via kerygma, mystagogy, polydoxic sophiology and not metaphysics, God is love

analogy of anthropo-poietical vs theo-poietical realities?

misunderstandings re nature of evil, e.g. moral vs ontic privation, suffering vs pain, intrinsic vs ontic, proportionalist vs consequentialist vs deontological, unavoidable double effect, essential instrumental vs unavoidable instrumental vis a vis human moral calculus, anthropologically?

and God’s relationship to evil, moral and natural?

omnipotence compatible or incompatible with evil? 

if incompatible, no genuine evil
evil genuine or illusory?

consequentialist or nonconsequentialist? 

essential vs unavoidable?

irredeemable vs instrumental?

and in/defensibility of presuppositions re nature of divine constraints (essential, metaphysical and/or kenotic) vis a vis sovereignty?

and in/defensibility of logical arguments vis a vis the integrity of our god-conceptions (christopher mchugh) vis a vis compossibilities?

  • omnipathic defense
  • free will defense
  • tehomic defense
  • greater good defense
  • soul making defense

and in/defensibility of evidentialist argumentation?

arguments, logically, not argumentation, plausibly, evidentially?


epistemic distance and theosis are necessary and sufficient, so, suffering and evil are not necessary or essential, just unavoidable

epistemic dx as formative & exculpable vs moral & sinful?

ontic privations (absence of pleasure and/or presence of pain w/o suffering

suffering & moral evil not in divine economy, none necessary or essential, not raw materials, some unavoidable waste products? recyclable vs irredeemable?

consequentialist  or essential & nonconsequentialist or unavoidable? 
some instrumental and/or recyclable vs irredeemable? 

some essential or unavoidable, pain and ontic privation of epistemic dx?

epistemic distance via ontic privation w/o essential or necessary suffering or moral evil (nonconsequentialist) using epistemic dx and theosis as necessary means, but some suffering or evil instrumentally transformative, recyclable, some irredeemable, perishable

plus apokatastasis and constellation of eternalized human goodness: all wholesome trivialities, every beginning of a smile, an eternal constellation of luminaries of various intensities and diverse multiplicities

key concepts:

  • essential constraints
  • metaphysical constraints
  • kenotic constraints
  • cumulative case 
  • forced, vital, live options
  • pragmatic – but not vulgar
  • equiplausibility
  • epistemic warrant
  • existential disjunction
  • normative justification
  • too weakly probabilistic
  • mere competing plausibilities
  • too bayesian, no consensus re priors
  • logical defense vs evidential plausibilities or theodicies
  • naturalist moral realism
  • minimalist aesthetic teleology
  • aesthetic Teleology
  • pentametric holonic
  • metaphysical agnosticism
  • theological skepticism
  • pneumatological imagination
  • panSEMIOentheism
  • anti-theodicial
  • pluralistic theologoumena
  • polydoxic 
  • diverse sophiological trajectories
  • essential soteriological trajectory
  • human authenticity
  • lonergan’s conversions

Soul-making & the Greatest Good as divinely willed ends in an Anti-theodicy

As I have grappled with the problem of evil, I have been rationally satisfied by different logical accounts of the divine economy, all which seem, more or less, consistent with special revelation, some seeming not to be necessarily mutually exclusive from others, none seeming to necessarily be the case.

I view soul-making and the greatest good as divinely willed “ends” for which neither evil nor suffering are divinely willed “means,” which, instead, include, for example, epistemic distance and theosis. 

Epistemic distance necessarily introduces finitude and contingency, which, while they can constitute failures to cooperate with grace, merely result from “inabilities.” While moral evil can also constitute such failures, those result, instead, from “refusals” to thus cooperate, in a word, sin

An anti-theodicy can logically affirm both divinely willed soul-making and the greatest good as “ends,” while denying evil and suffering as necessary “means” in the divine economy? God would never intend evil or suffering but whenever confronted with same could work — not with, but — providentially against and around them and seemingly, perhaps, could even opportunistically exploit every new set of circumstances to bring about the greatest good (Romans 8).

Now, in this scenario,  anthropological questions would beg for me about why we wouldn’t necessarily suffer from mistakes, only from sin (but, oh what a better world it would be!) Still, I’d rather remain theologically skeptical, on one hand, about how epistemic distance and theosis, alone, might have (even if somewhat implausibly so) operated in a possible world without evil and sin than, on the other hand, skeptical regarding God’s lack of moral intelligibility vis a vis what might exculpate Her from employing sin and suffering as necessary means (often seemingly repugnantly so).

Did Hugh McCann offer a soul-making, greater good evidential theodicy, arguing — not only “that,” logically, but — “how,” plausibly, sin and evil were “necessary” divine means?

Or did he otherwise recognize that, logically, the realities of sin and evil, even if probable, were definitely not necessary, and could successfully be worked around without overwhelming the divine economy with its eschatological, soteriological, sacramental, ecclesiological or sophiological ends? 

As for the uninstantiated “possibilities” for moral evil, as logically entailed by freedom, they would have no ontological status. Arguably, too, sinful choices would result in axiological privations, evil, itself, having no ontological status?

Also, God, in McCann’s acount, appeared to be ontologically authoring, pre-morally, only an indispensable ontic evil (via epistemic distance as finitude not sin), which a proportionate reason would underwrite with the currency of a greater good, but otherwise remained teleologically uninvolved with any intentional agency, who, alone, would have directly intended such an evil, hence, alone, committing a morally culpable act.

Perhaps this is all more consistent with Scotus, who believed that the Incarnation was in the divine will from the cosmic get-go and not occasioned by some felix culpa.

God neither needs nor wills sin. Epistemic Distance requires ontic privations, not deontic depredations.